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THE MEANING OF LAW IN THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION
Ever since the Sophists in the fifth century B. C. began
seriously to discuss the origin, nature, and function of law,
the apparently simple question, "what is law," has been the
source of many a heated controversy. The dicta of theo-
logians, the various and often conflicting speculations of
philosophers, the theories of sociologists, the opinions of
jurists, and the views of political scientists - they all have
contributed heavily to make this question an extremely
difficult one. Even among renowned jurists and teachers
of the law we frequently encounter that confusion about
the meaning of law which once solicited from St. Paul the
famous exhortation: "Desiring to be teachers of the law,
they understand neither what they say nor whereof they
affirm." (1 Timothy 1:7)
Perhaps the main reason of all this confusion should be
looked for in the fact that, in the final analysis, the ma-
jority of legal writers use the term law in a rather loose
manner. Thus it happens that this term, in order to suit
some particular but not always licit purpose, is being em-
ployed to mean any one of at least three essentially different
things, and at times all three. In this fashion three quite
different problems are simply referred to as law, and fre-
quently serious attempts are being made to define all three
problems in terms of just one of them.
The oldest and at the same time narrowest meaning of
the term law is, historically speaking, that of an aggregate
of laws, in other words, the historically developed and ac-
crued body of authoritative materials of actual decisions of
controversies - the authoritative grounds of and guides to
the determination of controversies.
More recent developments in the fields of philosophy and
jurisprudence, such as the rise of Neo-Kantianism and
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juristic functionalism in general, brought about a radical
change in the attitude towards the meaning of law. This
new attitude did not concern itself so much with the law
as a body of authoritative materials, that is, with what we
might call a "state" or actual condition, but mainly thought
of the law in the light of certain ends to be achieved by
this body of authoritative materials. Thus it came about
that the law was interpreted as meaning the legal order.
Hence law was being understood in terms of a regime de-
vised for the adjustment of certain human relations signi-
fying as it were the control of certain phases of human con-
duct through the systematic and intelligent (planned) ap-
plication of the force of a given politically organized so-
ciety. It was conceded, however, that any such legal regime
requires a number of authoritative materials which in them-
selves cannot be called a regime or legal order, but are
merely one of the elements which constitute this regime or,
as some writers have put it, the guides to this regime. Con-
sequently, many subsequent discussions concerning the na-
ture and function of law turned into debates about the na-
ture and function of the whole legal order, that is to say,
the whole regime of social control through law. Thus when-
ever reference is made to "law and order," "respect for the
law," or the "blessings of the law" we are actually referring
to the legal order rather than to a body of authoritative
materials.
The further result of the functional attitude towards law
is the mounting emphasis upon the administration of law,
in other words,. the administration of a body of authoritative
materials rather than these materials themselves which con-
stitute or, at least should constitute, the guides to or bases
of this administration. Thus law came to mean what the
late Justice Cardozo felicitously called the "Judicial Pro-
cess," and what Mr. Landis, the former Dean of the Har-
vard Law School, preferred to refer to as the "Administra-
tive Process" rather than administrative law. Law, then,
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according to this third meaning, denotes a process of deter-
mining controversies, which process is intended to uphold
the legal order or the administrative regime itself. Accord-
ing to this third meaning, however, law would, in the final
analysis, actually denote a practically infinite variety of
processes as they are actually or "officially" carried on. It
would become, as it has under totalitarian governments, but
a phase of governmental activity. Consequently, whatever
is done "officially" through the medium of such processes
would be law.
These are, in short, the three basic meanings of the term
law, three meanings, that is, which always must be kept
apart. The fact that all three are usually referred to by
one and the same term has contributed much to the general
confusion which seems to mar most of the discussions con-
cerning the nature of law. Too often certain definitions or
inferences are being drawn from just one of these three
specific meanings, only to be applied afterwards as defining
in a generalized and universal manner the whole subject
which in fact comprises all three meanings. Thus it has
become a common practice among philosophers and jurists
to identify the part with the whole, and the substance with
its functions. In some instances, particularly among the so-
called social functionalists, the dictates of personal prefer-
ence or a partisan philosophy have actually become the sole
arbiter as to which partial meaning of the complex term
law should stand for the whole. Thus even in serious dis-
cussions among truly erudite and experienced scholars it
has become a regular, although pernicious habit, surrep-
titiously to switch from one particular meaning of the term
law to another and subsequently to define all three mean-
ings in terms of just one whenever this would promote the
envisaged line of argument.
Although in our basic definition of law we must always
clearly distinguish between law as a body of authoritative
materials for actual decisions, the legal or administrative
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order, and the legal or administrative process, there is no
reason why, by the employment of the idea of "social con-
trol through law," we could not unify these three particular
meanings into one single over-all meaning; or, as Dean
Pound has put it, why we should not conceive of a regime
which is a highly specialized form of social control, carried
on in accordance with a body of authoritative materials, and
applied in a judicial or administrative process. In this
manner we are able to bring together into one single inte-
grated and intelligent idea the three specific meanings of
the term law without vitiating any one of the three.
The average common law lawyer, if he is at all interested
in definitions, will first of all reach for that definition which
sees in the law a body of historically developed and accrued
authoritative grounds of and guides to actual decisions; the
body of authoritative materials for determining contro-
versies. But here, again, we must remember that these au-
thoritative grounds and guides are made up of a number of
conceptions such as two "types" of legal precepts, a legal
technique, and certain legal and even meta-legal ideas and
ideals. For, as Dean Pound sees it, law in the sense of a
body of authoritative materials is actually a body of au-
thoritative precepts, developed and applied by an authorita-
tive technique in the light of authoritative traditional -
often taught - ideals. Merely to think of law in terms of
a body of precepts would be as disastrous as would be any
attempt to define law as a mere highly developed or com-
plicated technique or perhaps as the mere manifestation of
a particular social ideology of a particular time, place or
group. Although all these factors constitute essential in-
gredients of what we call law, no one by itself and without
the other could sufficiently explain the full meaning of law
as a body of authoritative materials. For the technique of
developing and applying the body of authoritative materials,
for instance, in itself is as authoritative as are these precepts.
Furthermore, the ideal element of the law, the body of re-
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ceived and taught authoritative ideals, is likewise of funda-
mental importance to our understanding of the full signifi-
cance of the term law.
Law in its original meaning is a body of authoritative ma-
terials for actual decision of controversies. As such it must,
first of all, be looked upon as a body of authoritative pre-
cepts. For a body of precepts constitutes one of the three
basic elements of what we call law in the above mentioned
sense. The "precept element" of the law itself falls into
four distinct categories, namely (a) principles, (b) rules,
(c) precepts prescribing standards, and (d) precepts defin-
ing conceptions.
Principles in the sense of the law might be best described
as authoritative starting paints for legal classification and
legal reasoning. They are used by the jurist to classify and
organize the whole of judicial experience, and become opera-
tive whenever we are trying to differentiate various cases.
The fact is that differences appear among various cases only
when we are able to discern a definite principle behind the
felt difference. This operation permits us then to compare
a certain developed line of experience of actual decisions in
some special field of law with some other line of legal or
judicial experience in another field. This, again, makes it
possible not only to refer certain cases to one general point
of departure for legal reasoning, and others again to some
other such starting point, but also enables us to discover an
even more inclusive starting point of legal reasoning which
might embrace the whole field.
Principles and legal conceptions enable us not only to
deal with controversies without taking recourse to a mass of
legal rules, but also makes it possible in a satisfactory
manner to dispose of newly arising problems and cases in
case there are no specific rules to be found to settle them.
A legal conception, therefore, is nothing else than an au-
thoritative legal category into which a case may be fitted
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in order that certain rules, principles, or standards then be-
come applicable. This is most important in those cases
where no definite and detailed consequences are being at-
tached to a definite and detailed situation of fact. Take,
for instance, the case of a bailment in general. Here we
cannot speak of a definite and detailed legal consequence
being attached to a definite and detailed state of fact. Nor
can we discover here a definite point of departure for legal
reasoning. But there are always certain well defined legal
categories into which a case of bailment may be fitted with
the, result that certain rules, principles, and standards then
become applicable.
A legal rule, again, is a precept attaching a definite and
detailed legal consequence to a definite and detailed situa-
tion of fact.
A legal standard is a measure of conduct prescribed by
law. For conduct in any form requires an established stand-
ard. Anyone who in his conduct departs from an established
standard does so at the peril of answering for the resulting
damage. There are always various notions connected with
the concept of standard, such as the concept of reasonable-
pess, fairness, or "due care" in one's conduct. But there is
not and cannot be, a universal precept once and for all de-
fining reasonableness or fairness. For in the law it would
be most unreasonable and unfair even to essay the establish-
ment of a universally valid and applicable standard of rea-
sonableness of fairness. This leaves no other way out than
to refer the notion of reasonableness or fairness to a con-
formity of an ideal, to what a reaonable man can be ex-
pected to do in a given concrete and, therefore, unique
situation.
The ideal element in the law also constitutes a vital part
of any social order under the rule of law. It contains the
larger purpose of every social control through law and as
such it is a most important background of all interpretation
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and application of legal precepts. In his "The Common
Law," p. 1, Justice Holmes points out that the life of the law
has not been logic, but experience, an experience, that is,
which takes into account the felt necessities of the time, the
prevailing moral and political theories, and the intuitions of
public policy. This ideal element assumes decisive impor-
tance whenever the courts are faced with new problems
which make it necessary to choose between several equally
authoritative starting points for legal reasoning. Here the
courts will have to, and actually do, take into account a total
and, hence, ideal conception of the social order of time and
place. At the same time they have to consider the total
legal tradition as to the ultimate and, hence, ideal end or
purpose of social control. And this ideal picture of the total
social order as well as the ultimate ideal purpose of this
total social order, in turn, furnish the courts with that larger
ideal background which enables them to interpret and apply
legal precepts. Particularly in cases where standards of
conduct are to be applied the ideal element in the law is al-
ways of crucial significance. Take, for instance the idea of
reasonable conduct. While the law enjoins what is reason-
able under certain concrete circumstances, it nevertheless
fails to provide us with exact precepts which might inform
us once and for all what behaviour is reasonable in abstracto
and what behaviour is not. Hence the interpretation and,
above all, the application of the standard of reasonableness
in one instance will be governed by the received social ideal
of a particular social actuality, while in another instance
it is dictated by the received social ideal of a different social
actuality, with the result that we are confronted in what
seems to be the same state of fact by entirely different legal
results. For what might be extreme carelessness in the
forest tracts of the Northwest, such as the throwing away
of a lighted match, could very well be the proper or, at least,
indifferent conduct in the desert lands of the Southwest.
Thus it might be said that the social ideals of time, place,
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and particular circumstances, which the courts consciously
and even unconsciously employ, give authority and au-
thoritative direction to the application of legal precepts.
Whenever we are speaking of the meaning of law we
should also keep in mind the person who is using this term.
For it is obvious that the law means something different to
different persons, professions, or social groups. Take, for
instance, the average man: to him, without doubt, law is
something like a "rule of conduct" in certain matters, a guide
which tells him what to do and what not to do in a certain
situation. And, again, it might appear to him as being a
threat, or as the late Justice Holmes puts it, as something in
which particularly the "bad man" may find a restraining
threat. To the legal adviser, on the other hand, law or to
be more exact, the legal precepts defining conceptions and
the principles of law, signify a basis of prediction of "of-
ficial" action, both judicial and administrative. But a word
of caution might be inserted here: It is not the law itself,
but the adviser who does the predicting, because the most
that could ever be said about the law is that it furnishes us
with a basis of prediction. To the lawmaker, again, law is
something that for some definite reason ought to be done or
ought not to be done. And because he thinks this he con-
ceives the law as being a command or a threat. To the
judge, lastly, law means a model or pattern of decision, in
other words, a rule of decision.
These four standpoints, although they seem violently to
conflict with one another, can nevertheless be brought into
harmony. We have merely to remember, as Dean Pound
has pointed out, that the judges can for the most part be
expected to follow the authoritative precepts, which precepts
then also serve as commands or threats, as rules of a definite
conduct, and as bases of prediction.
Summing up we might define law as a historically evolved
and accrued body of authoritative grounds of and guides to
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actual determination of controversies. These grounds and
guides may serve as directives for actual decisions, as guides
to a definite conduct, or as bases for the prediction of "of-
ficial" action. This body is, at the same time, a highly
specialized instrument of social control within an existing
organized and politically developed society - an order, that
is to say, which carries on in accordance with a body of au-
thoritative materials applied in a judicial or administrative
process. It does so (a) by drawing upon recognized rules
in the narrower sense of the term, that is, rules which attach
a definite and detailed legal consequence to a definite and
detailed situation of fact; (b) by utilizing certain legal
principles which are authoritative starting points or bases
of legal reasoning whenever a situation arises which is not
governed by a rule in the narrower sense of the term; (c)
by employing precepts which define certain authoritatively
determined legal categories into which a concrete case may
be fitted with the result that certain rules, principles, or
standards then become applicable; and (d) by applying pre-
cepts which prescribe certain standards or measures of con-
duct relative to the particular instance or individual case and
which are, in the final analysis, determined in their applica-
tion by the particular social ideal of time, place, and circum-
stance. This body of authoritative materials, moreover,
operates through a definite judicial or administrative pro-
cess; and this process in itself is only an application and de-
velopment of these authoritative materials through the em-
ployment of an authoritative technique which is understood
and practiced in the light of certain received and likewise
authoritative ideals as well as in the light of a taught and
equally authoritative tradition.
Anton-Hermann Chroust.
